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1 Introduction.
Two of the most active fields in economics in the last few years have been growth theory
and macro-political economy. The first one was inspired by new "endogenous growth
theories" to reconsider which economic factors influence economic development. Recent
research in "macro political economy" has explored the connections between politics,
institutions and macroeconomic policies and outcomes.
Both fields are motivated by empirical questions and are very much concerned with
policy issues. The growth literature attempts to understand which economic conditions
such as education, openness, government regulation, infrastructures, government spend-
ing in various programs are more or less important for growth. The political economy
literature is based upon the idea that economics alone cannot fully explain the enormous
variance across countries of economic outcomes and policy choices. Similarly, economics
alone cannot explain why different countries at relatively similar stages of development,
facing relatively similar economic shocks have adopted rather different policies. Eco-
nomic policy choices are not made by "benevolent dictators", who can be found only in
academic papers. Policy is the result of political struggles within a certain institutional
structure. The empirically oriented researcher and the policy advisor has to be aware of
how politics influences policymaking.
This paper reviews the recent literature which has grown at the intersection of these
two very active areas of research. Specifically, we analyze what we have learned and
what puzzles (and there are many !) are left unsolved in the area of the socio-political
1
determinants of growth. We focus on the relation between four key variables: economic
growth and capital accumulation; political instability; political freedom and democratic
institutions; and income inequality.
Needless to say, the literature on this topic is immense. Both political scientists and
economists have devoted decades to the study of these interactions.1 We do not even
attempt to offer a comprehensive review of this literature. We focus instead on the
more recent research efforts in this area.2 In fact, several recent papers have investigated
various links between a subset of the variables listed above: income distribution and
growth; political instability and growth; political rights, democracy and growth; savings,
investment and political instability. The goal of this paper is to clarify how all these
contributions to the literature fit together, by taking a more systematic view at the
interactions between the variables described above.
We begin in section 2 with a discussion of the relation between political instability
and growth. The two key issues here are how to define and measure political instability
and how to account for the fact that neither of the two variables is exogenous to the
other. In section 3 we discuss the question of whether democratic institutions and, more
generally, political rights foster or hinder economic growth. Section 4 reviews the basic
insight of several recent papers that have argued that income inequality is harmful for
growth through its effects on taxation and therefore the return to capital accumulation.
1A classic in this area of research is Huntington (1968).
2For more comprehensive surveys the reader is directed to Adelman-Robinson (1988) on income distri-
bution and growth; to Roubini (1990) on democracy and growth; to Huntington and Dominguez (1975)
for a "political scientist" approach.
In section 5 we propose a way of integrating the literature reviewed in the preceding
sections.3 Specifically, we investigate whether the effects of income inequality on growth
and investment goes through political instability. The hypothesis is that less egalitarian
societies are more unstable socially and politically, and instability has a negative effect
on capital accumulation and growth. Up to this point, we have focused on the relation
between politico-institutional factors and income distribution on one side and growth
on the other side. In section 6 we begin exploring the intermediate links between these
two sides by focusing on fiscal policy. We investigate the two mechanisms that drive the
models of income distribution and growth surveyed in section 4: the effects of income
distribution on fiscal policy and the effects of fiscal policy on investment and growth.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Political instability and growth.
Quantitative studies on the relationship between political instability and growth have to
tackle two major issues. First, how to define political instability. Second, how to deal
with joint endogeneity: does political stability foster growth or viceversa, or both ?
The first issue, the definition and measurement of political instability, has been ad-
dressed in two different ways. The first way is based upon the construction of an index
of socio-political unrest. This index summarizes several indicators of more or less vio-
lent forms of political protest and social violence. The second way of defining political
3This section draws upon some recent work of Alesina and Perotti (1992).
instability focuses on executive turnover, namely the frequency of government collapses.
The first approach, which we label the "socio-political instability" (SPI) approach,
begins with a list of variables which identify events such as riots, political demonstrations
against the government, assassinations etc.4 The researcher must then construct an
aggregate index that projects in one dimension this multitude of variables. A statistical
technique that leads to such reduction from a multidimensional set of variables to a single
one is the method of "principal components".5 More recently, this method of construction
of an SPI index has been used by Venieris and Gupta (1986), who show that SPI affects
negatively the saving rate.6 Using similar measures, Benhabib and Spiegel (1992) argue
that socio-political instability reduces investment. However, their empirical results are
not very strong on this point.7
As far as growth is concerned, Barro (1991) adds two political variables in his cross-
section growth regressions (the frequency of coups d'etat and the number of political
assassinations) and finds that they negatively influence growth.
The second approach to modelling political instability focuses on executive turnover.
This "executive instability" (El) approach begins by estimating the propensity of gov-
ernment collapses by means of probit regressions. The independent variables in these
regressions are political variables (protests, riots, executive reshuffling etc.), economic
4The most widely used sources for these variables are Jodice and Taylor (1985) and Banks (various
issues).
5The classic reference for this approach is Hibbs (1973).
6Venieris and Gupta (1989) point out interesting non linearities in this relationship.
7The concept of SPI has proven quite powerful in explaining other phenomena, especially in developing
countries: for example, Ozler and Tabellini (1992) show that more instability leads to an increase in
external debt in developing countries.
variables (past growth, inflation etc.) and institutional variables (whether the country
is a democracy or not, the electoral system etc.). A high estimate of the probability of
government change is viewed as an indicator of executive instability.
This measure of instability is used by Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) in
regressions where the dependent variable is inflation. They conclude that political in-
stability increases inflation. Edwards and Tabellini (1991) pursue this line of research
further and show that executive instability (El) leads to "myopia" in fiscal policy de-
cisions: unstable executives borrow more heavily than stable ones. Similarly, Goodrich
(1991) finds that in LDC's foreign direct investments are negatively affected by this
measure of executive instability.
An important problem that the contributions surveyed above do not address for-
mally is that of the joint endogeneity of political instability and growth or inflation.
This problem is particularly evident when dealing with the notion of executive instabil-
ity. Economic variables such as growth and inflation are used to explain the propensity
of government changes, which in turn is used as an explanatory variable for economic
outcomes. Clearly, problem of simulteneity and reverse causality are crucial here.
Londegran and Poole (1990) suggested a clever way of dealing with this problem.
They estimate a two equation model. One equation is a probit regression where the
dependent variable is the number of coups d'etat. The dependent variable in the second
equation is per-capita income growth. They find that poverty and, to some extent, low
growth increase the likelihood of coups. Furthermore, coups d'etat are "persistent": past
coups increase the likelihood of more coups. Thus, if a country has a history of coups,
it is likely to experience more coups in the future. On the contrary, and somewhat
surprisingly, they find that the propensity to coups does not reduce growth. The same
authors (Londegran and Poole (1992)) confirm these results using a different sample and
estimation techniques.
Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1991) adopt Londegran and Poole's technique but
use different specifications. First, they control for many more economic determinants of
growth. Second, they focus not only on coups but on a broader definition of government
changes, which includes both coups and constitutional changes of the executive. While
they confirm Londegran and Poole's results on the effects of poverty on coups, they
find that a high propensity to executive instability reduces growth. This result is quite
robust and holds in several different specifications of the system. Recent results by Block-
Blomberg (1992) confirm the findings of Alesina et al. (1991) on this point.
In summary, the picture that emerges from this line of research is the following. Poor
countries tend to have coups and are socio-politically unstable. Since political instability
reduces the incentives to save and invest and therefore reduces growth, poor countries
may fall into a "trap". They are unstable because they do not manage to become rich;
they find it hard to become rich because they are politically unstable.8
8A somewhat different view on this topic has been put forward by Huntington (1968), who concentrates
on the causal link from growth to socio-political instability. He argues that it is not always true that all
good things go together. When poor countries experience a period of take-off and rapid growth, social
unrest may actually increase: new demands are generated, the process of urbanization accelerates, the
entire society is in turmoil. This is not in general true for those rich countries that, for some reason,
experience a period of high growth: rich countries, unlike poor ones, have already the institutions in
Some summary statistics on the data typically used in this area of research are quite
suggestive. These statistics are reported in Table 2. Table 1 defines all the variables used
not only in Table 2 but also in the rest of this paper.9 Table 2 shows that Latin America
is the region which has had the highest frequency of "major government changes" and
coups d'etat. It is also the region with the second lowest rate of growth, after Africa.
Africa also has a very low frequency of constitutional changes of government and a high
frequency of coups and the lowest income per-capita. The variable DEM varies from close
to 1 (fully democratic systems) in the industrial countries, to almost 3 (dictatorships) in
Africa (see Table 2). A monotonic relationship between this variable and growth does
not jump out of Table 2. Africa is the least democratic region and has the lowest growth
rate. However, Asia is less democratic than Latin America but has grown more rapidly.
These simple observations point to the following hypothesis: what influences growth
is not so much the type of regime (dictatorship or democracy) but regime instability, i.e.
the propensity to coups and major changes of government. In the next section we turn to
a more systematic discussion of the relationship between growth and political freedom.
place to cope with social and economic transformations. Therefore, according to Huntington, the relation
between instability and growth is nonlinear, and its sign depends on the level of development: positive for
poor economies, negative for richer economies.
9Table 2 is adapted from Alesina et al.(1991).
3 Democracy, freedom and growth.
The concept of "political freedom" can be viewed in two ways, which are related but
not identical. The first defines "democracy" and "political freedom" based upon the
existence of free competitive (i.e. more than one party) elections. This definition was
used in Table 2 above. The second focuses on the amount of civil and economic rights
that are available to the population.
The two definitions are not identical. Some dictatorships are certainly undemocratic
according to the first criterium, but may grant a certain amount of civil and especially
economic rights to the public. The "four dragons" in South East Asia (South Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong) are a good example.
Why should one expect any relationship between growth and democracy defined in
the first way? One line of argument emphasizes the possibility of a negative relationship.
With political freedom various pressure groups have a "voice" in the political arena. Their
demands for redistributive policies either imply legislative deadlocks or are resolved by
increasing the size of the government. Furthermore, democratic institutions are supposed
to be slower in responding to external shocks. Finally, incumbent politicians are expected
to engage in sub-optimal and short-sighted policies to be re- elected.10
Each of these arguments, however, has a rebuttal. First, even dictators need to
please various constituencies to avoid being overthrown (see Ames (1987)). Redistributive
10On pressure groups and lobbying see Krueger (1974), Bhagwati (1982) and Mueller (1979). On fiscal
deadlocks see Alesina (1988) and Alesina-Drazen (1991). For a survey of political business cycle models
see Alesina (1992).
struggles between various socio-economic groups can certainly occur in various forms
even without democratic institutions. In fact, lacking a constitutional way of changing a
leader, political change often requires violence and disruption of market activities. Thus,
a priori, there seems to be no obvious relationship between democracy and growth.
As a matter of fact, Alesina et al. (1991) find no relationship between democracy
defined in this way and growth. This inconclusive result is consistent with the earlier
literature (reviewed by Roubini (1990)). Basically, the point is that several dictatorships
have followed growth enhancing economic policies (again, think of South-East Asia) while
many others have destroyed their economies (think of much of Africa). Indeed, the careful
and extensive study by Helliwell (1992) concludes that "it is still not possible to identify
any systematic net effects of democracy on subsequent economic growth."
Perhaps one may try to disaggregate the group of dictatorships, by differentiating
the truly "kleptocratic" ones from the more "benevolent". The former would include
those rulers who have aimed at maximizing their personal wealth and the welfare of their
clan and close supporters, and have disregarded to a large extent social welfare. The
second group would include the dictators that have followed policies favorable to the
socio-economic development of their countries. The problem of this exercise, of course, is
that it easily becomes very close to a tautology: growth is high in dictatorships which are
growth enhancing, and low in dictatorships where the rulers follow sub-optimal policies !
Another problem of this line of research is that democratic institutions are very highly
correlated with per capita income which, in turn, is highly correlated with education.11
Thus, when a democracy variable is found significant in a regression where the dependent
variable is growth, one has to worry about whether what is really being captured is the
effect of per capita income or education. Disentangling the individual effects of these
three highly correlated variables (GDP, education and democracy) is not a simple matter
(see Helliwell (1992) on this point).
The second definition of democracy does not focus on elections, but on the level of
political and economic freedom. The most widely used index of civil liberties is the Gastill
index that ranks countries in seven groups. As an indicator of economic rights on might
use measures of restrictions on capital mobility, trade restrictions or other measures of
economic regulations. As before, one can think of arguments which are consistent with
either a positive or a negative correlation between civil liberties and inflation. One may
argue that economic liberty fosters entrepreneurship, market activities and growth. On
the other hand, more economic liberty may translate into more conflicts over distribution.
Results by Barro (1991) and Ozler and Rodrik (1992) suggest that, in fact, civil liberties
are conducive to growth and capital accumulation.
As to economic freedom, it is perhaps easier to argue that less regulation and fewer
obstacles to individual market activities should spur growth. Bhalla (1992) uses the black
market premium as a proxy for economic freedom and reports a weak but positive effect
11Table 2 illustrates this correlation. Recently there has been a welcomed push towards democratization
in many parts of the world. However, in the sixties, seventies and early eighties (the sample typically
covered in growth studies) there were very few democracies outside of the OECD group of countries.
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of civil and economic liberties on growth.
The problem with these concepts of economic liberty is that the results obtained by
using them are virtually undistinguishable from statements like "economic inefficiencies
are bad for growth". It is not completely clear whether these results on economic freedom
are implying something other than the fact that economic inefficiencies are not conducive
to growth.12
What one can conclude from the research effort summarized in this section is that the
hypothesis that democratic institutions are not conducive to growth is not supported by
the available evidence. Certain dictatorships which score very low in terms of political
rights because they do not allow free competitive elections, have grown very fast and have
created the necessary environment for market activities to prosper. Other dictatorships
have performed very poorly.
An interesting question, which links the previous section on political instability to the
present one, is what happens in period of transitions, from dictatorship to democracy.
Transitional periods may be associated with high levels of political uncertainty concern-
ing the institutional outcome of the process. Furthermore, social demands repressed
under the unconstitutional rule are likely to explode at the beginning of a new demo-
cratic regime. Until the new democratic regime is consolidated, it may face tremendous
pressure to accommodate conflicting demand of different groups. In addition, collapsing
dictatorships are likely to bequests serious economic problems for two reasons. First,
12Roubini and Sala-I-Martin (1991) find that a measure of openness is positively related to growth. In
some sense, openness, like the black market premium can be thought of as a proxy for economic liberty.
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poor economic performance is likely to be one of the causes of the collapse of the old
regime. Second, collapsing dictators may have a very high discount factor and follow
very short-sighted policies. Haggard, Shariff and Webb (1990) and Haggard and Kauf-
man (1989) document, in fact, that countries in transition exhibit a worse performance
in terms of many economic indicators than either established democracies or "strong"
(i.e., established and not collapsing) dictatorships.
4 Income distribution and growth.
A third strand of literature focuses on the relation between income distribution and
growth. Needless to say, this is not a new topic in economics: starting from the theories of
Kuznets and Kaldor, these issues have been hotly debated in the development economics
literature (for a survey, see Adelman-Robinson (1988)). What characterizes the new
contributions is their close connection with the new theories of endogenous growth, and a
focus on previously neglected links from income distribution to growth, rather than from
growth to income distribution.
In particular, three links are emphasized in this recent literature. The first approach
stresses the role of imperfect capital markets. In general, individuals cannot freely borrow
against their future income: two frequently cited reasons for this difficulty are imperfect
information and monitoring on the part of lenders. Thus, most people must rely, par-
tially or completely, on their own resources to invest in physical or human capital. It
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follows that the original distribution of these resources determines how many agents can
invest, and therefore what is the resulting rate of growth of the economy. Important
contributions to this line of research are Galor-Zeira (1988), Banerjee-Newman (1991)
and Aghion-Bolton (1991).
In the second approach, the more unequal is the distribution of resources, the larger
the incentives for agents in the lower tail of the distribution to engage in rent-seeking
activities, which hinders investment and therefore growth. A recent formalization of this
argument is Benhabib-Rustichini (1991).
In the third approach, on which we mostly focus here, the level of government ex-
penditure and taxation is the result of a voting process in which income is the main
determinant of a voter's preferences; in particular, poor voters will in general favor a
high level of taxation.13 This is because they will either pay a lower share of taxes, or
will disproportionately benefit from government spending. In an inegalitarian society,
with many poor agents relative to the average, the majority of voters will then vote for
high taxation, which again will discourage investment and therefore growth. Alesina and
Rodrik (1991) (henceforth A-R), Bertola (1991) (B) and Persson and Tabellini (1991)
(P-T) are three contributions in this area.14
13This line of research generalizes to a dynamic context static models of voting on the tax rate by Romer
(1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981).
14Perotti (1990) and Saint-Paul and Verdier (1991) are two other recent contributions that study the
politico-economic determinants of growth. In both papers the agents vote over the level of government
expenditure and growth is driven by accumulation of human capital, but the two mechanisms are different.
In the former, individuals vote over the level of purely redistributive transfers: this determines the post-
tax income of the agents of the economy and therefore who can privately invest in education. In turn, this
determines the rate of accumulation of human capital. In the latter, agents vote over public expenditure on
education: therefore, income distribution affects the accumulation of human capital through this channel.
13
Despite some differences in the specifics of the models, the contributions in this group
share a common structure. Each of them consists of an economic mechanism and a
political mechanism.15 The former describes the effects of fiscal policy on growth. The
latter describes how income distribution determines fiscal policy (taxes and government
expenditure) through the voting process.
The papers differ in the type of government expenditure they consider: public in-
vestment (A-R), redistribution from capital to labor (B), purely redistributive transfers
(P-T). The common element is that, whenever the share of government expenditure on
GDP rises, the accompanying increase in taxation reduces the after tax marginal product
of capital that can be appropriated by private investors: this reduces the rate of accu-
mulation of capital and therefore growth. The distribution of initial resources comes into
play because it helps explain how these types of government expenditures are determined.
Consider first A-R. Here the relevant distribution of resources is the functional distri-
bution of income. The economic mechanism is as follows: public investment is financed
by proportional taxation of capital income. Therefore, when taxes increase in order to
finance more public investment, the after-tax return from private investment in capital
decreases. This effect tends to decrease the rate of investment and therefore the rate of
growth of an economy. Now consider the political mechanism: the higher the proportion
of capital income in an individual's total income, the higher the price that individual has
to pay for the benefits of public investment, and therefore the lower the tax rate that
15For a more complete survey of these models, see Perotti (1992a).
14
individual will vote for. According to the median voter theorem, when agents vote on
the tax rate to be adopted the level of taxation preferred by the median agent in the
distribution of resources will prevail on all the other proposed tax rates.
By combining the economic and the political mechanisms one obtains that, the higher
the proportion of capital income to total income of the median voter, the lower the tax rate
that prevails through the voting process and the higher the resulting rate of investment
and growth. Unfortunately, we have no reliable cross-section data set on the distribution
of wealth. However, it is well known that the distribution of wealth is more skewed than
the distribution of labor income. This means that, if in country A the median income
is lower than in country B, the same is true for their median wealth/labor ratios. Thus,
one can use data on the distribution of income to proxy for the data on wealth/labor
ratios. The testable implication of this model is therefore that there should be a positive
relation between the income of the median voter and the rate of growth of the economy.
B also focuses on the functional distribution of income, but the economic mechanism
is different: revenues from taxation are used for redistribution, not for infrastructure
investment. Capital income is taxed and the proceeds are directly redistributed to agents
who derive their income from labor. The effect of a higher level of taxation is then
similar to the A-R model: it decreases the after-tax marginal product of capital that an
investor can appropriate, and therefore it decreases investment and growth. The political
mechanism is also similar to that of A-R: the higher the proportion of capital income to
labor income, the more an agent has to lose from a proportional tax rate on capital that is
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redistributed to an individual in proportion to his labor income. Thus, the tax rate that
prevails through the voting process is again a negative function of the wealth/labor ratio
of the median voter. Combining the two mechanisms, one obtains the same reduced-form
prediction as in A-R: the higher the wealth/labor ratio of the median voter, the higher
the rate of growth of the economy. By applying the same reasoning used above, this can
be translated into a testable prediction, i.e. that there should be a positive association
between the income of the median voter and the rate of growth of the economy.
P-T also analyze the effects of redistributive policies, but they focus on redistribution
from rich agents to poor agents rather than from capital to labor; therefore, the relevant
concept is now that of the personal distribution of income. In the economic mechanism,
agents work and invest in human capital. Taxes are proportional to income, and the
revenues are redistributed lump-sum to all agents. Again, higher taxes discourage invest-
ment in human capital and therefore reduce growth. As to the political mechanism, since
taxes are redistributed lump-sum, poor voters pay a relatively small amount in taxes,
but receive the same benefits as rich voters. This means that the tax rate favored by an
individual is inversely related to his income. When preferences are aggregated through
the voting process, the implication is that the poorer the median voter relative to the
average, the higher the tax rate and again the lower the rate of investment and growth.
In summary, the common testable prediction of all these models is that there should
be a positive relation between growth or investment and the share of income accruing
to the third quintile (a proxy for the income of the median voter relative to the aver-
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age). Although one might not want to take the median voter result too literally, the
main message of this type of models is fairly clear: democratic societies with a more
inegalitarian income distribution will have a higher level of government expenditure and
taxation resulting from the political process, will invest less and therefore will grow more
slowly. Reduced-form regressions of the rate of growth or the rate of investment on
income distribution variables seem to support this conclusion.
These regressions are displayed in Table 3. The dependent variable is the average
growth in per-capita GDP from 1960 to 1985 (first 5 columns) and the average rate of
investment over the same period (last 3 columns).16 The regressions in columns (1),
(2), (3), (5) and (6) use the sample of 29 democracies; the other three columns include
all the 65 countries for which data are available. The list of countries in the sample is
reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix.17 Our income distribution variables are measured
in or around 1960, therefore at the beginning of the sample period on which growth is
computed. This is appropriate because in all these models the initial distribution of
income is taken as predetermined. The first three columns of this table highlight a
positive relationship between the income share of the third quintile of the population
16We use total domestic investment as the numerator in computing the average rate of investment. It
would be more appropriate to test these models using private domestic investment instead. Data on private
domestic investment, however, are only available for the 1970-85 periods. We use both private domestic
investment and total domestic investment in our regressions for the 1970-85 period. Results using the two
measures do not differ significantly. All these considerations apply to the regressions of Tables 6 and 7 as
well.
17For the precise definition of "democracy" used to select the 29 countries see Perotti (1992b). In any
case, the results presented in Table 3 are very robust to "sensitivity tests" on this definition; the results
do not change when "dubious" cases are kept in or left out from the group of democracies. On this point
see Alesina and Rodrik (1991,1992), Persson and Tabellini(1991) and Perotti( 1992b).
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and growth in democracies, as predicted by the theory. This result is robust to several
changes in the specification.18 Column 4 shows that the relationship between inequality
and growth does not hold when the non democracies are added in the sample. This
result is consistent with the theory; in fact the latter is based upon a voting mechanism,
which is clearly more applicable to democracies than to dictatorships. Columns 5, 6
and 7 display similar results obtained when the dependent variable is the ratio of total
domestic investment to GDP.19
Despite their apparent empirical success, several criticisms have been raised against
these models. First, all of them assume a very stylized voting process, where all proposals
are voted on in pairwise comparison in a referendum-type competition. Although this is
a frequently voiced criticism, we do not regard it as particularly damaging because the
empirical analysis concerns the long-run relations between income distribution, growth,
investment and fiscal policy, not their year to year relations. Therefore, even though year
by year fiscal decisions may be taken based upon many considerations which have nothing
to do with the median voter's preferences and wealth, in the long-run it is not implausible
to assume that the political equilibrium will reflect to some extent the position of such
"focal points" as the "median voter" and the "middle class".
Another frequently voiced criticism is that these theories are limited in their applica-
bility to democratic societies, and therefore almost exclusively to high-income countries.
18Alesina-Rodrik(1991,1992) present similar results obtained using a sample and data sources almost
identical to those of Table 3. Persson-Tabellini(1991) also obtain similar results using different data sources
on income distribution.
19See Alesina and Rodrik (1992) for further results on this point.
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Again, in our opinion this is not a serious limitation for three reasons. First, even in
dictatorships, an unequal income distribution may generate pressure for redistribution
which may influence government policies. Second, it is possible that different political
and institutional mechanisms explain fiscal policy in democratic and non-democratic soci-
eties. Indeed, we exploit this difference when we investigate the role of political instability
below. Third, the level of income is controlled for in all these regressions.
A third objection is that the predictions of these models can be quite sensitive to
the type of taxation and government expenditure considered. For example, in B's model
when taxes are used to redistribute income from owners of capital to labor (as we have
assumed up to now) it is intuitive that the rate of investment and growth will decrease.
However, when taxes are used to subsidize investment, a high level of taxation promotes
investment and growth by decreasing the price of capital relative to consumption and
therefore by inducing agents to postpone consumption. In both cases, rich agents oppose
high taxation: in the first case for obvious reasons, in the second because a high level
of subsidization of investment reduces the price of the capital these agents already own.
Thus, in a society where the median voter has a relatively low income the resulting high
level of taxation will hamper growth if taxes are used to redistribute income from capital
to labor, while it will promote growth if taxes are used to subsidize investment. Since
in the real world both instruments (and more) are used, a reduced form regression that
estimates the relation between income distribution and growth or investment may not be
completely informative. At a minimum, it is necessary to disaggregate this relation into
19
its two components: the effects of income distribution on a specific type of government
expenditure (the political mechanism) and the effects of that government expenditure
variable on growth and investment (the economic mechanism).
We will attempt to explore this point in section 6. First, however, we investigate
another link between income distribution and growth, one that passes through socio-
political instability.
5 Income distribution, political instability and growth.
The idea we test in this section, which is based on Alesina and perotti (1992), is at the
same time simple and plausible: when income distribution is very inegalitarian, the re-
sulting tensions within a society induce a high level of political instability. This instability
discourages investment and therefore generates a low rate of growth of the economy.
As pointed out in section 2 two definitions of political instability can be adopted:
socio-political instability (SPI) and executive instability, i.e. the frequency of govern-
ment collapses (El). In Alesina and perotti (1992) we adopt the first definition. More
specifically, we use a measure of socio-political instability originally proposed by Venieris
and Gupta (1986) and obtained by applying the method of "principal components" to a
large set of socio-political variables. It is constructed as follows:
SPI = .00065PROTEST + .127log(DEATHS + 1) + 2MDEM (1)
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where PROTEST is the number of political demonstrations against a government,
DEATHS is the number of individuals killed in acts of political violence, and DEM
is a dummy variable taking a value of zero if a country is a democracy, 1 if it is a
dictatorship and .5 in intermediate cases. A democracy is defined in the first way dis-
cussed in section 3: a country is a democracy if its leaders are elected in free competitive
elections.20 The democracy variable corrects for the fact that a given level of unrest (cap-
tured here by the combination of DEATH and PROTEST) is a an indicator of more
serious socio-political instability in a dictatorship than in a democracy, since in the former
demonstrations and political activities in general are obviously severely limited. Thus,
this index captures two forms of political demonstrations; less violent (PROTEST) and
more violent (DEATH).21
A simple bivariate system captures the basic mechanisms we are investigating:
INV = a0 + a^SPI + a2PPPIDE + a3EDUC + a4 AFRICA + el (2)
SPI = #,+ PiID + faGDP + (33INV + faURB (3)
+p5AFRICA + fcLAAMER + (37ASIA + e2
20The intermediate cases that receive a value of .5 are those countries in which some forms of elections
are held but without full liberty. An example is Mexico.
21
 The variable DEATHS is used in logarithmic form to prevent the cases of civil wars with thousands
of deaths from dominating the results.
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In the first equation we estimate the effects of socio-political instability (SPI) on in-
vestment, after controlling for some obvious economic variables, common in the literature.
The variable EDUC (enrollment ratio in primary school in 1960) captures complemen-
tarities in production between human and physical capital. PPPIDE is the deviation of
the PPP value of the investment deflator from the sample mean in 1960. It thus captures
distortions that make investing in physical capital more costly. We expect a higher level
of socio-political instability to discourage investment, i.e. a^ < 0.
The second equation specifies what can be regarded as plausible determinants of
socio-political instability. The variable GDP measures the level of economic develop-
ment. URB captures the degree of urbanization of a country. The regional dummies are
meant to capture region-specific cultural factors. We are particularly interested in the
two remaining variables. INV is essentially a proxy for the growth performance of an
economy: it is plausible to assume that socio-political instability should be a decreasing
function of the rate of growth of the economy. As to ID, the income distribution vari-
able, the hypothesis is that socio-political instability is a positive function of the degree
of inequality in the distribution of resources across individuals. We use two compact
measures of inequality: one is the share of income accruing to third and fourth quintiles
(MI DC LASS): a wealthy middle class implies a less polarized society. The second is the
ratio of the share of income accruing to the top quintile to the share of income accruing
to the first and second quintiles (TOPBOT): a high value of this ratio obviously implies
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more inequality.22 As we show in Alesina and Perotti (1992), results using the share of
the third quintile, MID, are not significantly different from those using MIDCLASS.
Before presenting the results of the regressions, we present in Table 4 and Table 5
the sample statistics and the correlations between the variables used in our system. Our
sample consists of 64 countries. Both tables refer to the period 1960-85. The two key
correlations for our purposes are those between SPI and INV, and between the income
distribution variables (MIDCLASS and TOPBOT) and SPI. The first correlation is
-.64. MIDCLASS has a correlation of -.45 with SPI and TOPBOT of .30. All of these
signs are consistent with our hypothesis. SPI is highly negatively correlated with both
the level of income and the level of education. However, the latter two variables are
highly correlated with each other: this explains why we did not include both variables
in our SPI equation. The same argument applies to the investment equation, where we
included only PRIM and not GDP.
Table 6 presents the estimates of our system for the periods 1960-85 (first four
columns) and 1970-85 (last four columns). Note that, for the 1970-85 period, the in-
come distribution variables are measured as close as possible to 1970. The results are
extremely good. All the three coefficients of interest have the expected sign and are
statistically significant. In the investment equation, socio-political instability depresses
investment; in the second equation, a good growth performance (as captured by the in-
22We use the share of income accruing to the first and second quintiles because measurement errors
are likely to be particularly severe when measuring the share of the poorest segment of the population.
Combining the two quintiles might eliminate some of the errors.
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vestment variable) makes a society more stable, while inequality generates socio- political
instability. All the other coefficients have the expected sign and are generally statistically
significant. For instance, SPI is inversely correlated to the level of income per capita
and (weakly) positively related to urbanization.
The negative effect of socio-political instability on investment is indeed a very robust
result: it holds for the 1970-85 subperiod as well, when the dependent variable is private
investment rather than total domestic investment, and for several different specifications
of the two equations. Alesina and Perotti (1992) the robustness of these results in much
more detail.
In summary, this section has successfully tested a causality link from income distri-
bution to socio-political instability, and from the latter to investment.
6 Income distribution, fiscal policy and growth.
Until this point we have ignored the policy mechanisms which link sociopolitical variables
(income distribution and SPI) to economic outcomes, such as growth and investment. We
now turn to examining fiscal policy as the main link. In the models of income distribution
and growth surveyed in section 4, fiscal policy plays a crucial role in both the political
mechanism and the economic mechanism. In the former, government expenditure and
the tax rate depend on the distribution of income through the voting process. In the
latter, government expenditure and the associated tax rate affect the incentives to invest
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and therefore the rate of growth. It is exactly these two mechanisms that we estimate
in this section. Thus, in this section we go beyond the results presented in section 4 by
decomposing the reduced form regression in its two main components.
We concentrate on the case of purely redistributive government transfers for at least
two reasons. First, transfers are the main component of virtually all government bud-
gets in the countries in our sample of democracies. Second, when public investment or
investment subsidies are involved one should be careful about what type of taxation fi-
nances them. For instance, in the A-R model results are likely to be reversed if public
expenditure on infrastructure is financed by proportional taxes on labor income. On the
other hand, they would probably continue to hold with sufficiently progressive taxation
on total income. In addition to this theoretical complications, the existing breakdown in
the tax data does not easily allow a satisfactory use of tax data in these regressions.
In contrast to the case of public investment, the idea that redistributional transfers
reduce the incentives to invest seems fairly robust. By their very nature, transfers are
associated with a redistribution of income from the high income agents to low income
agents, and are financed by distortionary taxes. As we discussed in section 4, high income
agents also tend to own a disproportionate share of the capital stock and to make most
of the investment in physical capital. Therefore, redistribution tends to hurt the agents
with the highest propensity to invest.23
23Perotti (1992b) presents results concerning public investment and public expenditure on education.
They do not differ qualitatively from the results presented here.
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We use data on a sample of 29 democracies24 to estimate the following model:25
INV = a0 + a^GTRAN + a2PPPIDE + a3EDUC + a4 AFRICA + et (4)
GTRAN = f30 + (3iMID + /32GDP + p3AGE+ (5)
^AFRICA + (36LAAMER + /MS/A + e2
The equation for investment is similar to the one estimated in the previous section,
except that now we want to estimate the effects of government transfers (GTRAN) on
investment. According to the theories of income distribution and growth discussed in
section 4, a\ < 0. The second equation estimates the main determinants of government
transfers. The income level, GDP, controls for Wagner's law, which states that govern-
ment transfers are a luxury good and therefore their share in GDP increases with GDP
itself. The proportion of individuals over age 65, AGE, appears as a regressor because
a large component of government transfers is social security benefits, which obviously
depend on demographic factors. As usual, the regional dummies capture region-specific
cultural and political factors that affect the share of transfers in GDP. Finally, and most
24The reason why we consider only democracies is that the mechanism linking income distribution and
transfers implies voting (see section 4).
25Note that in this specification the model is recursive. Estimates of a more complete model, which
includes a third equation for growth and a slightly more complete specification of the investment equation,
can be found in Perotti (1992b). In particular, in that paper the rate of growth appears as a regressor
in the investment equation to capture an accelerator effect. The results, however, are qualitatively very
similar to the ones presented here.
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importantly for our purposes, MID is the share of the third quintile of the population
in GDP. Since the median voter lies in the middle of the third quintile, this variable is
the right measure if one wants to test the political mechanism of the models of income
distribution and growth. The hypothesis is that the richer the median voter, the lower
the tax rate and therefore the share of transfers in GDP. Thus, we expect fii < 0.
The results are presented in Table 7. One can see immediately that both the coefficient
of government transfers in the investment equation and the coefficient of the third quintile
in the government transfers equation, i.e. the coefficients that define the economic and
the political mechanisms respectively, have the wrong signs. Transfers have a positive
effect on investment and they increase with the share of the third quintile. Thus, the
good reduced form results presented in section 4 seem to be generated by something
more complex than the simple economic and political mechanisms postulated by the
theories of income distribution and growth discussed there. Note also that the other
variables of the system have essentially the expected signs. In particular, AGE is an
important determinant of transfers, and a higher price of investment goods (PPPIDE)
deters investment.
These results appear to be quite robust. As we did for the system of section 5, we
subjected our estimates to several checks. First, we used MIDCLASS and TOPBOT as
income distribution variables instead of MID. In so doing, we test a looser implication
of these models, according to which societies with unequal income distribution express
more demands for redistribution and therefore experience lower growth. However, in most
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cases MIDCLASS has a positive sign and TOPBOT a negative sign in the GTRAN
equation, although they are never statistically significant. Thus, even when using these
measures the seemingly robust finding is that more inequality is associated with less
transfers, not more.
In addition, we changed the specifications of the two equations, without significant
changes in the estimates of the coefficients ax and fix. We also computed a set of test
statistics to detect the presence of important measurement errors and heteroskedasticity,
and estimated the GTRAN equation using estimators that are consistent and efficient in
the presence of heteroskedasticity and/or measurement error. Finally, we estimated the
government transfer equation using the 2SLS version of the Krasker-Welsch "bounded-
influence" estimator already introduced in section 5. In nearly all these cases, the coeffi-
cient of the income distribution variable still have the same (wrong) signs as in Table 7,
although they are never significant at standard levels.26
As a matter of fact, we are not alone in finding that government transfers have a
positive effect on growth. Sala-I-Martin finds the same correlation in a large sample of
countries including both developed economies and LDCs. Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou
(1992) also find puzzling and intriguing results on the effects of the composition of public
expenditures on growth. They report that in a sample of LDCs "an increase in the share
of current expenditures has positive and statistically significant growth effects" while
"the relationship between the capital component of public expenditures and per capita
26For a more technical and detailed sensitivity analysis of these and other results concerning models of
income distribution and growth, see Perotti (1992b).
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growth is negative".
These rather counterintuitive results suggest what we regard as an important direction
for future research. The basic idea of the models by A-R, P-T and B is that more
inequality raises demand for fiscal redistribution. It would appear that just looking at
the ratio of transfers on GDP is not enough to capture the general idea of redistributive
policies: the latter may take more complex and hard to pinpoint forms. For instance,
the composition of public expenditure in different programs, the degree of progressivity
of the tax system and the relative share of income versus property taxes are only a few
of the many channels that fiscal redistributions can take. This is, in fact, a promising
and unexplored area of research.
7 Conclusions.
We conclude by indicating which are, in our view, the next steps in this area of research.
First, the role of political instability deserves a closer look, along several dimensions.
Thus far, we have considered two definitions of instability, socio-political and executive
instability. At least another concept seems to be potentially relevant, one that has to do
with "legislative instability" . In fact, variables like the number of parties in a coalition
and dummies for coalition governments and for majority governments are economically
and statistically significant in explaining inflation (Edwards and Tabellini (1992)) and
the share of transfers in GDP (Perotti (1992b)). This suggests that legislative instability
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could play an important role in affecting the policy outcomes and therefore the growth
performance of an economy. Another interesting question is whether different concepts
of instability have different explanatory power and different impacts on policy outcomes
depending on the level of income of a country and/or its democratic status.
This brings us to the second open question involving political instability. So far, we
have studied the relation between investment and political instability (section 5) and
between investment and government transfers (section 6) separately. However, there are
good a priori reasons (and some empirical results, as just mentioned) to suggest that
political instability in its three forms should have an impact on government transfers
and on the composition of government expenditure. Sala-I-Martin (1992) has recently
argued that the direction of causation could go the other way too: since government
transfers are used by policy-makers to appease citizens in periods of discontent and
unrest, transfers can reduce political instability. By reducing political instability, transfers
could positively affect investment. The interactions of these three variables - investment,
political instability and transfers - deserve to be investigated empirically.
A second important direction for research would be to use the time series dimension
of the data more extensively. For instance, in trying to understand the positive effects
of government transfers on investment, it would be interesting to investigate whether
the positive cross-section association between investment and transfers is dominated by
short-lived periods of high growth driven by demand effects, in particular government
expenditure. Then, as government expenditure remains high, growth declines in con-
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sequence of the distortionary effects of taxation. Similarly, it would be interesting to
explore in time-series data if the relation between the different concepts of political in-
stability and government expenditure depends on the level of instability, and what is the
timing of this relation. This analysis might go some way in trying to explain the first
puzzle pointed out in section 6: the positive association between government transfers
and investment.
Another line of research might help explain the second puzzle, the negative association
between inequality and transfers. Indeed, the positive association that the theory sug-
gests depends crucially on a very specific assumption about the distribution of taxes and
benefits across income classes: the combined effect of taxes and expenditure is uniformly
progressive. This might well be a counterfactual assumption, which might explain the
results we have obtained. There is a large literature of country studies on the distribu-
tional incidence of taxation and government expenditure which we plan to use in future
research. More generally, a closer communication between the literature on case studies
and the large cross-section studies would be very beneficial.
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Table 1: Definition of variables and data sources.
This Table describes the data used in the regressions. All the data are from the Barro-
Wolf [1989] data set, except for the income distribution data (which are from a variety
of source detailed in Table A.I in the Appendix) or unless otherwise indicated.
GDP: GDP in thousands of 1980 dollars, from the Summers-Heston data set.
GR: rate of growth of GDP between years 1960-85 or 1970-85.
EDUC: primary school enrollment rate in year 1960 or 1970.
MID: share of the third quintile of the population in or around year 1960 or 1970.
MIDCLASS: share of the third and fourth quintiles of the population in or around 1960
or 1970.
TOPBOT: ratio of the share of the fifth quintile to the share of the first and second
quintiles, in or around 1960 or 1970;
URB: Urban population as percentage of total in year 1960 or 1970. Source: World
Bank Tables;
AGE: Percentage of population over age 65 in year 1960 or 1970. Source: World Bank
Tables.
GTRAN: Nominal government transfer payments as ratio to nominal GDP (average
from 1970 to 1985).
INV: ratio of real domestic investment (prvate plus public) to real GDP (average from
1970 to 1985 or from 1960 to 1985.).
PRIVINV: Ratio of real private domestic investment to real GDP (average from 1970
to 1985);
PPPIDE: Deviation of the PPP value for the investment deflator from the sample mean,
1960;
GCHANGE: Dummy variable takung the value of 1 for every change of the executive,
both constitutional and unconstitutional. Source: Jodice-Taylor (1982), corrected by
Alesina et al. (1992);
MJCHANGE: dummy variable taking the value of 1 for every unconstitutional change
of the executive and every constitutional change of government with a change in the party
(or group) leading the executive. Source: Alesina et al. (1992);
COUPS dummy variable taking the value of 1 for every unconstitutional change of the
executive. Source: Jodice-Taylor (1982);
EX AD JUST: dummy variable taking the value of 1 for every adjustment in the com-
position of the executive, without a change of leadership. Source: Jodice-Taylor (1982).
Table 2: Sample means of the data: 1960-82.






























































































































This table is from Alesina et al. (1992). For some variables, units of measurement may be
different from those utilized in this paper. Region breakdowns uses the IMF coding system.
Hence, the "other" category refers to non-industrialized European countries.
Table 3: Reduced form regressions, 1960-85.









































































































































OLS. t-statistics in parentheses. The sample of 29 countries includes democracies only. The
sample of 65 countries includes all countries for which data on income distribution and urban-
ization are available.
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Table t\\ Summary statistics (sample 1960-85).
























































Table f: Correlation matrix (sample 1960-85).

































































For definitions of variables and units of measurement, see Table 1. For sources, see Appendix.
Tabled: Investment and SPI equations, 1960-85 and 1970-85.






























































































































2SLS. t-statistics in parentheses. Estimates using 3SLS are very similar. First four columns: 1960-85. Last
four columns: 1970-85. Number of observations: 64 (1960-85) and 53 (1970-85).
Tabled: Investment and govt. transfers eqs., 1960-85 and 1970-85.

































































































































2SLS. t-statistics in parentheses. Estimates using 3SLS are very similar. First four columns: 1960-85. Last
four columns: 1970-85. Number of observations: 64 (1960-85) and 53 (1970-85).
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Table A.I: Sources of income distribution data.
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK [1983]: Income Distribution and Economic growth
in developing Asian Countries, Asian Development Bank Economic Staff paper NO. 15,
Manila, Philippines;
FIGUEROA, ADOLFO and RICHARD WEISKOFF [1980]: Viewing Social Pyra-
mids: Income Distribution in Latin america, in: Robert Ferber, ed.: Consumption and
Income Distribution in Latin America, ECIEL, Washington, D.C.;
FLORA, PETER, FRANZ KRAUS and WINFRIED PFENNING [1987]: State,
Economy and Society in Western Europe, Volume II, St. James Press, Chicago, IL;
JAIN, SHAIL [1975]: Size Distribution of Income: A Compilation of Data, World
Bank, Washington, D.C.;
KUZNETS, SIMON [1963]: Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of nations
VIII: Distribution of Income by Size, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2,
1-80;
LECAILLON, JACQUES et. al. [1984]: Income Distribution and Economic Devel-
opment, ILO, Geneva;
PAUKERT, FELIX [1973]: Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development:
a Survey of Evidence, International Labor Review 108 97-125;
PRYOR, FREDERIC L. [1989a]: Income Distribution and Economic Development in
Malawi: Some Historical Perspectives, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 36, Washing-
it
ton, D.C.;
PRYOR, FREDERIC L. [1989b]: Income Distribution and Economic Development
in Madagascar: Some Historical Perspectives, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 37,
Washington, D.C.;
SCHNITZER, MARTIN [1974]: Income Distribution: a Comparative Study of the
United States, Sweden, West Germany, East Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan,
Praeger Publishers, New York, NY;
UNITED NATIONS [1981]: A Survey of National Sources of Income Distribution
Statistics, United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs,
New York, NY;
VAN GINNEKEN, WOUTER and JONG-GOO BAK, eds. [1984]: Generating Inter-
nationally Comparable Income Distribution Estimates, ILO , Geneva;
WORLD BANK [1976]: Economic Growth and Income Inequality in Korea, World
Bank Staff Working paper No. 240, Washington, D.C.;
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT [1979]: The World Bank, Washington, D.C.;
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT [1989]: The World Bank, Washington, D.C.;
ZARTMAN, WILLIAM I., ed. [1983]: The Political Economy of Nigeria, Praeger
Publishers, New York, NY.
Table A.2: List of countries and democracies.
Tanzania; Malawi; Sierra Leone; Niger; Burma; Togo; Bangladesh; Kenia; Botswana(D);
Egypt; Chad; India(D); Morocco; Nigeria; Pakistan; Congo; Benin; Zimbabwe; Mada-
gascar; Sudan; Thailand; Korea; Zambia; Ivory Coast; Honduras; Senegal; Gabon;
Tunisia; Taiwan; Philippines; Bolivia; Dominican Republic(D); Sri Lanka(D); El Sal-
vador; Malaysia(D); Ecuador; Turkey(D); Panama; Brazil; Colombia(D); Jamaica(D);
Greece(D); Costa Rica(D); Peru; Hong Kong; Iran; Mexico; Japan(D); Spain(D); Iraq;
Ireland(D); South Africa(D); Israel(D); Chile; Argentina; Italy(D); Uruguay; Austria(D);
Finland(D); France(D); Netherlands(D); U.K.(D); Norway(D); Sweden(D); Australia(D);
Germany(D); Venezuela(D); Denmark(D); New Zealand(D); Canada(D); Switzerland(D);
U.S.(D).
A "(D)" indicates that the country is in the sample of democratic countries.
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